What Countries Does Russia Trade With? A Practical Map

Who Russia trades with now, in one view

The trade map has been redrawn since the early 2020s. The largest single counterparty is China; India, Turkey and the CIS states follow; the Gulf, Brazil, Egypt, Iran and South-East Asia have all increased their share. Europe and the United States have not disappeared from the picture, but their weight is far smaller than a decade ago and the paperwork around each deal is heavier.

The practical consequence for a foreign investor is that Russian trade is no longer organised around a single financial centre. It runs through several hubs, each with its own banks, currencies, logistics routes and documentation habits. Choosing the right hub is usually more important than choosing the right goods.

• China: the largest single partner - energy, metals, timber, seafood and fertiliser out; machinery, vehicles, electronics and components in.
• India: crude oil, coal, fertiliser and sunflower oil out; pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, textiles and auto parts in.
• Turkey: energy, grain and metals out; construction services, textiles, food and machinery in, plus a re-export channel.
• Gulf states (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait): re-export, gold, electronics, cars and food, alongside joint project interest.
• CIS and EAEU (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan): tariff-free or near-tariff-free goods movement, ruble settlement, shared technical standards.
• Others of growing weight: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Egypt, Algeria, Iran.

China: the anchor relationship

China is the largest single buyer of Russian commodities and the largest single supplier of finished goods to Russia. On the export side the flow is crude oil, pipeline gas and LNG, coal, copper, nickel, aluminium, timber, seafood, grain and fertiliser. On the import side it is vehicles, construction and agricultural machinery, consumer electronics, components, chemicals and textiles.

Logistics run mainly overland through Far East and Siberian border crossings by rail and road, with seasonal congestion and mismatched container flows - full boxes going one way, empty ones coming back. The Free Port of Vladivostok regime, with 2,130 projects registered (KRDV, 2026), exists largely to build industrial and logistics capacity around that corridor.

Settlement is predominantly in yuan and rubles. Chinese banks screen transactions individually, so the binding constraint is usually the bank, not the goods: purpose of payment, end user and HS codes all matter. For a Chinese investor, a joint venture producing inside Russia for the domestic market is now a common alternative to pure export, and the tax base for that is a 25% profit tax, with 0-5% available in certain special regimes (Federal Tax Service, 2025).

India, Turkey and the Gulf: three different doors

India has become a major buyer of Russian crude, coal, fertiliser and sunflower oil, and sells back pharmaceuticals, textiles, engineering goods and auto components. Settlement can involve rupees and dirhams routed through Gulf banks, which means rupee balances have to be managed rather than simply accumulated. Indian importers also have to satisfy their own banking compliance, which is often stricter than the trading relationship itself.

Turkey is both a partner and a corridor. It buys gas, oil, grain, metals and fertiliser, and sells construction services, textiles, food and machinery. Turkish contractors have a long history of building in Russia, and Turkish banks are sensitive to secondary exposure, so payment routes need to be agreed before shipment rather than after.

For Gulf investors, the UAE functions as a re-export, gold and financial hub, while Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait are more project-driven. Trade here is often embedded in a wider relationship - a supply contract plus a stake in logistics, petrochemicals or food processing - and the structuring question comes up earlier than in pure commodity trade.

The CIS and EAEU: the tariff-free ring

The Eurasian Economic Union - Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan - is a single customs territory. Goods moving between members face no customs duty, technical regulations are harmonised and standards are mutually recognised. Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are not members but are deeply integrated through freight, labour and ruble settlement, and Russian-language contracting is the working norm across the region.

Why this matters to a Gulf, Chinese or Indian investor: an entity established in Kazakhstan, Armenia or Kyrgyzstan can serve the entire EAEU market, and the union also has free trade agreements with several third countries, which can give preferential access for goods meeting the rules of origin. The caveat is that those rules are substantive - a light repackaging or a change of invoice does not qualify, and customs authorities do check.

• Tariff-free movement applies to goods of EAEU origin, not to any goods passing through.
• Technical standards and certification are shared, which shortens product registration.
• Ruble settlement is the default, with local currencies available in most member states.
• Corporate, tax and labour rules differ by member state - the choice of jurisdiction matters more than the tariff line.

What is actually traded: the commodity backbone

Russian exports remain dominated by energy, metals, fertiliser and food. Russia is the world's largest palladium producer, with 44% of world supply (USGS, 2025), and is a major supplier of nickel, platinum, aluminium, potash and phosphate fertiliser, wheat, sunflower oil and timber. The resource base is the reason the trade relationships are long-term rather than opportunistic: a country holding 20% of the world's unfrozen fresh water in Lake Baikal (UNESCO, 1996) is discussed by counterparties in decades, not quarters.

Imports are the mirror image: machinery and equipment, vehicles and spare parts, electronics, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food ingredients and consumer goods. That split shapes the finance. A fertiliser or metals contract is heavy, insured, shipped in bulk and financed over months; an electronics contract is lighter, faster and more exposed to bank screening and to re-export controls.

For an investor, the practical point is that trade with Russia is logistics-heavy and contract-heavy. The structures that work for one commodity rarely transfer unchanged to another.

How payment and compliance actually work

Settlement is the part that decides whether a deal happens. 86% of Russian exports are settled in rubles and friendly-country currencies (Bank of Russia, 2025); the remainder uses other currencies where banks still accept them. Typical mechanisms are correspondent accounts with banks in third countries, national payment messaging, letters of credit, escrow and prepayment. Which of these is available depends on the counterparty, the commodity and the bank, not on a general rule.

Compliance is deal-specific. The EU, US, UK and other regimes differ in scope, and a structure that is permitted under one may be restricted under another - for both the exporter and the importer. Screening applies to the Russian counterparty, its owners, the bank chain and the end use of the goods. Dual-use items and re-exports through third countries are the areas where transactions most often stall.

Two habits save time. First, agree the bank chain before agreeing the price. Second, take independent compliance and legal advice on your own transaction rather than relying on the other side's assurances. Operating inside Russia itself is straightforward in one respect: 88% of retail payments are cashless (Bank of Russia, 2025), so domestic business does not run on physical cash.

If you want to trade or invest, not just observe

The sequence that works is roughly the same whether you are a trading house in Dubai, a manufacturer in Guangdong or a logistics group in Istanbul.

Start with the channel: direct export-import, a Russian trading company, a joint venture, or an entity in an EAEU member state serving the wider market. Then check the restrictions before you spend on anything else. Foreigners cannot own agricultural land - only lease it, for up to 49 years. Border areas including Sochi, Anapa, Gelendzhik and Novorossiysk are closed to foreign land ownership. Investment in strategic sectors requires approval under Law 57-FZ, and investors from countries designated unfriendly face special account regimes and additional government approvals.

Then choose the vehicle and the regime. Russia offers 90 special investment contracts covering more than ₽2 trillion of declared investment (Government of Russia, 2025); 674 companies are registered in special administrative regions (Ministry of Economic Development, 2025); the Free Port of Vladivostok has 2,130 projects (KRDV, 2026) and the Arctic Zone has 1,000 residents with ₽1.1 trillion declared (KRDV, December 2025). These regimes are not interchangeable, and eligibility depends on the activity, the region and the size of the commitment.

On tax, the baseline is a 25% corporate profit tax with 0-5% available in certain special regimes (Federal Tax Service, 2025), and standard VAT of 22% since 1 January 2026 (Federal Tax Service, 2026). Rates, thresholds and eligibility change, so confirm the current position with a Russian tax adviser before modelling anything.

The macro backdrop is worth knowing but is not a substitute for the deal itself: real GDP grew 4.1% in 2023 and 4.9% in 2024 (Rosstat, 2023-2024); general government debt is 17% of GDP against 124% in the US (IMF WEO, 2025); the Bank of Russia key rate is 14% (Bank of Russia, September 2026); the equity market is capitalised at 19.5% of GDP against a 66% target by 2030, with 106 licensed investment platforms (Bank of Russia, 2026); and Moscow office vacancy is 7.6% (IBC Real Estate, Q2 2026).

This article is general information only. It is not investment, legal, tax or compliance advice, and no view expressed here should be relied on for a specific transaction.

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